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ABSTRACT 
Does a leader’s ethnicity affect the regional distribution of basic services such as 
education in Africa? Several influential studies have argued in the affirmative, by using 
educational attainment levels to show that children who share the ethnicity of the 
president during their school-aged years have higher educational attainment than their 
peers. In this paper we revisit this empirical evidence and show that it rests on 
problematic assumptions. Some models commonly used to test for favouritism do not 
take adequate account of educational convergence and once this is properly taken into 
account the results are found to be unstable. Using Kenya as a test case, we argue that 
there is no conclusive evidence of ethnic favouritism in primary or secondary 
education, but rather a process of educational convergence among the country’s larger 
ethnic groups. This evidence matters, as it shapes how we understand the ethnic 
calculus of politicians. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the late colonial era primary school attainment has been growing rapidly across much 
of Africa. Enrolment has increased sharply across both rural and urban populations, while 
gender gaps have declined and are today negligible in many countries. Progress in secondary 
schooling has been more varied, but also shows steady enrolment growth in aggregate. 
There remains debate, however, over the drivers of this diffusion of basic education and the 
role of ethnic politics in shaping its pace. Specifically, have these educational advances 
benefitted some ethnic or regional groups disproportionately? Several influential papers 
contend that ethnic politics matters to educational outcomes in Africa, as leaders favour their 
own districts and ethnic communities by targeting educational resources to them. This is 
expected to result in an uneven pace of attainment growth that bestows considerable 
advantage on children who share the ethnicity of the sitting president and/or minister of 
education (André et al. 2018; Alwy and Schech 2004; Franck and Rainer 2012; Kramon and 
Posner 2016; Li 2018). 
This evidence has informed broader academic debates about the nature of resource 
distribution in multi-ethnic countries. Evidence from the education sector has been used to 
demonstrate that ethnic patronage permeates African societies. It provides a clear economic 
motivation for voting along ethnic lines as citizens can expect greater access to public 
resources if the candidate from their ethnic group wins (Carlson, 2015).  The education sector 
is seen as particularly ripe for favouritist policies as education spending constitutes a large 
share of total government expenditure and is a club good, inasmuch as it can be targeted 
towards specific schools and regions, unlike pure public goods like clean air and national 
defence. 
However, this understanding of ethnic patronage in Africa as resting on broad-based delivery 
of goods and services to politicians’ ethnic groups, remains contested. Some scholars have 
argued that ethnic patronage in Africa is an elite game with little trickle-down to the 
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population at large, as politicians can take the support of their own communities for granted 
(van de Walle, 2007). According to this perspective, there is no reason to assume that leaders 
would target broad-based services, such as primary education, towards their own ethnic 
communities. Another strand of the literature on ethnicity has argued that leaders of multi-
ethnic states usually seek to avoid accusations of capture and threats to their rule by 
allocating resources in equal shares across all groups or regions (Azam, 2008; Francois et al., 
2015). An alternative set of empirical studies has found some evidence in support of this 
theory. Francois et al. (2015) have shown that African leaders seek to balance cabinet 
appointments amongst all larger ethnic groups, while Simson (2019) finds that public sector 
employees in Kenya and Uganda are more regionally representative than educational 
disparities alone would predict. Similarly, a historical study of the Kenyan police force in the 
early decades of independence found no evidence that ethnicity was linked to preferential 
treatment, although it did influence and embolden the behaviour of policemen (Vanden 
Eynde et al., 2018).  Finally, Kasara (2007) finds evidence that African presidents tend to tax 
the main cash crop products of their co-ethnics at a higher rate than other crops, suggesting a 
negative rather than a positive effect of being a co-ethnic of the president. This mixed 
evidence about ethnic discrimination in African settings thus offer conflicting perspectives on 
why and how ethnicity is politicised, and the distributional consequences this will have.  
In this paper therefore, we return to and scrutinize the evidence of ethnic favouritism in 
primary and secondary education. We argue that it rests on shaky assumptions and remains 
far from conclusive. Because of the strong growth and convergence in attainment rates, 
counterfactual educational attainment growth is difficult to specify and invariably rests on 
debatable assumptions about how educational attainment would develop in a world absent of 
ethnic favouritism. The existing papers fail to lay out these counterfactuals and a more 
careful review of their models raises serious doubt about some assumptions. In Kenya 
moreover, our focus country, rapid educational attainment across all larger ethnic groups, and 
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convergence between leaders and laggards, strongly overshadows any marginal advantage of 
sharing ethnicity with the president. Once we take this into account, we find no conclusive 
evidence of ethnic favouritism in education. This suggests that the evidence of broad-based 
ethnic benefits accruing from ethnic voting may be over-stated. 
This paper uses the Kenyan case as its main example. We focus our attention on Kenya as a 
type of most-likely crucial case study (Gerring 2007), such that Kenya is the place where we 
would most likely expect to find evidence of ethnic favouritism in education, given the extant 
literature on this topic (Kramon and Posner, 2016; Li, 2018).  Indeed, there is currently more 
scholarship on ethnic and regional favouritism in Kenya than in any other individual sub-
Saharan African country (Burgess et al. 2015; Kramon and Posner 2016; Li 2018; Vanden 
Eynde et al. 2018; Simson 2019), which is arguably due to the highly ethnicized nature of 
Kenyan politics as well as to its high-quality data and the fact that it has experienced two 
ethnic presidential transitions.  The fact that we do not find evidence of ethnic favouritism in 
educational outcomes in Kenya suggests that the much broader literature on ethnic and 
regional favouritism deserves closer scrutiny. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. It starts by laying out some descriptive statistics 
on educational inequalities in Kenya, before discussing how ethnic favouritism is most 
appropriately conceptualized and measured. It then critiques the evidence of ethnic 
favouritism given by Franck and Rainer (2012), Kramon and Posner (2016) and Li (2018), 
showing both the conceptual problems with their models and weaknesses in their empirical 
results. Lastly, it reviews the evidence on the supply factors that are thought to drive ethnic 
favouritism and challenges the conclusions reached by Kramon and Posner (2016). It 
concludes with a reconsideration of the evidence on ethnic favouritism in education. 
 
ETHNIC FAVOURITISM IN THE CONTEXT OF EDUCATIONAL CONVERGENCE 
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In many African countries both primary and secondary attainment have grown rapidly since 
independence. Gender gaps have also fallen. Across the continent as a whole, the gross 
primary enrolment rate rose from 55% in 1971 to 98% in 2014, while the primary completion 
rate1 jumped from 46% to 69% over the same period, and the gender parity – the ratio of girls 
to boys - rose from 0.7 to 0.9. Performance varies considerably across countries, but in the 
last decade, eleven countries attained primary completion rates above 80%. Secondary school 
enrolment remains considerably lower, but rose from 17% to 43% (gross) over the same 
period and gender differences fell among secondary students too (WDI 2018). 
Those countries approaching universal primary attainment will, by definition, have seen 
convergence in primary attainment levels. If all children today complete primary school, 
growth in attainment must have been faster among those groups or regions that started the 
period with levels below average. This, as we shall see, confounds any measure of ethnic 
favouritism, as illustrated using the Kenyan case below. 
The Kenyan case 
Kenya is often used to test theories about ethnic effects because it offers two clear and sharp 
transitions in leader ethnicity without the confounding effects of wars or coups, from a 
Kikuyu president (Jomo Kenyatta) to a Kalenjin president (Daniel Arap Moi) in 1978, and 
back to a Kikuyu president (Mwai Kibaki) in 2002. Researchers have exploited these 
leadership transitions to examine whether they coincide with a shift in the flow of public 
resources from Kikuyu to Kalenjin beneficiaries and vice versa, particularly in the case of 
primary and secondary schooling (Alwy and Schech, 2004; Franck and Rainer, 2012; 
Kramon and Posner, 2016; Li, 2018). Most of these studies use survey data to examine the 
educational attainment of a representative sample of Kenyans by birth year. The studies rest 
on the assumption that schooling is undertaken at set ages, and a person’s year of birth 
 
1 I.e. gross intake ratio: number of entrants into the final year of primary schooling divided by size of age cohort. 
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therefore indicates when said person attended school. Cross-sectional data on ethnic group 
educational performance over successive birth cohorts therefore offers a historical record of 
enrolment levels by year and allows researchers to test whether the relative educational 
performance of a given ethnic group changes amongst those cohorts that received their 
education in the years after a presidential transition. 
Building on this approach, the three charts in Figure 1 compare average years of primary 
schooling for the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and the remaining population (‘other’) by birth year, for 
cohorts that would have attended school under the presidencies of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel 
Arap Moi, respectively. These charts use pooled Kenyan census data, where ethnicity is 
proxied based on place of birth rather than self-reported ethnic identity.2 According to the 
ethnic favouritism literature, we should expect to see disproportionate access to schooling for 
Kikuyu children educated under President Kenyatta, and for Kalenjin children educated under 
President Moi. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The first chart gives the years of primary schooling for each of the three groups by birth 
cohort. The second measures the relative attainment of Kikuyu and Kalenjin respondents, by 
dividing the group average years of schooling by the national mean.3 The last chart provides a 
measure of absolute differences, by subtracting the national mean level of education from the 
group average. In other words, how many more/less years of primary schooling do the 
Kikuyu/Kalenjin have than the average Kenyan? The vertical lines mark (roughly) the 
 
2 Kramon and Posner (2016) and Li (2018) in contrast use Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data, which 
specifies ethnicity precisely, and use the census as an out-of-sample validation. Our decision to use the census 
data more extensively is discussed in Appendix 1; Appendix Figure 1 compares the two samples and shows that 
the trends are very similar. The census has the advantage that the sample is considerably larger and avoids the 
gender imbalance inherent in the DHS samples. Note also that we cap the cohorts under consideration, to 
respondents aged 20 and above, to avoid including students who have still to complete their education, as 
discussed in Appendix 3. 
3 Because we cannot assign ethnicity to respondents born in Nairobi, which have unusually high educational 
attainment rates, Nairobi-born respondents have been removed from the total and ‘other’ category. This 
omission has very little impact as the population share born in Nairobi is small (<2%). 
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cohorts that received most of their education under a Kikuyu and Kalenjin president 
respectively, assuming that primary schooling takes place when a child is 6-13 years of age.  
The first chart shows that attainment grew steadily for all groups over the period under 
review, but, unsurprisingly, the growth in years of schooling slowed as groups began to 
approach the primary education ceiling of 8 years. The Kikuyu ethnic group started the 
postcolonial period with a pronounced educational advantage while the Kalenjin had a small 
disadvantage, but the gap between the two groups has shrunk over time. 
This convergence process is more evident in the second and third charts. Relative to the 
national mean, the Kikuyu advantage (in percentage terms), fell sharply over Kenyatta’s 
presidency and then stayed relatively constant during Moi’s presidency (at roughly 15% 
above the national mean), while the Kalenjin rose relative to the national mean under 
Kenyatta’s presidency, and then steadied. The same trend is evident on an absolute basis. The 
gap in number of years of schooling to the national mean closed over the Kenyatta years, then 
stayed relatively steady at roughly 0.7-0.8 years under President Moi. 
The trends in secondary school attainment mirror the primary school trends, but with a lag 
(see Appendix Figure 2). The relative Kikuyu attainment declined under Kenyatta’s 
presidency although the absolute gap in years continued to increase, while the Kalenjin 
relative performance and gap with the mean began to close roughly midway through 
Kenyatta’s presidency and continued into the beginning of Moi’s presidency. The Kikuyu 
gap increased again from about 1990, during Moi’s presidency. 
Given these many different dynamics affecting primary attainment – an unequal postcolonial 
starting point, strong attainment growth across all larger Kenyan ethnic groups, convergence 
in years of schooling between those with a head-start and the laggards, as well as the 
complication that years of schooling has an upper bound after which no further progress can 
be measured – how exactly should we define and measure ethnic favouritism in educational 
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access? The Kikuyu educational advantage was on average larger under Kenyatta than under 
Moi and vice versa for the Kalenjin, but essentially all the Kikuyu-Kalenjin convergence 
happened under Kenyatta’s presidency. Furthermore, neither group saw attainment levels 
decline under a non-co-ethnic president. In absolute terms, Kikuyu children continued to 
outperform the Kalenjin throughout Moi’s presidency too. 
If Kenyatta and Moi’s presidential terms had been swapped, and a Kalenjin president 
governed Kenya between 1964 and 1978, are we right to expect a different trend? Would the 
Kikuyu educational advantage have been erased overnight through quotas or immediate 
removal of educational resources from Kikuyu districts? Would the Kalenjin disadvantage 
have disappeared immediately? Furthermore, how much of the relative educational 
performance of ethnic groups should be attributed to government policy in the first place, and 
how much was driven by decisions by families and communities themselves? Lastly, are 
inequalities in access to education the most appropriate means of measuring favouritism in 
education provision, or might differences in educational quality across groups have provided 
another means by which politicians could favour their own? The next section reviews 
evidence about the drivers of educational attainment and discusses ways of conceptualizing 
and measuring inequality, fairness and favouritism. 
WHAT DRIVES EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT GROWTH? 
The literature on educational attainment usually distinguishes between demand and supply 
factors that influence household decisions to send their children to school (Handa, 2002; 
Dostie and Jayaraman, 2006). Schooling is rarely costless. In developing countries in 
particular, a large share of the costs of basic schooling are often borne by households or local 
communities, in the form of school fees, levies, uniform requirements, community 
contributions to school management or construction, as well as the opportunity cost of 
keeping children in school rather than in productive labour. Demand for schooling is 
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therefore thought to be shaped by the expected returns to education and the household’s 
ability to pay, as evidenced by a large body of recent empirical research (Dostie and 
Jayaraman, 2006; Deininger, 2003; Lincove, 2009). Most of these studies find household 
income or wealth have a positive effect on schooling outcomes. Many also find that attitudes 
towards education, proxied by parental education, are important independently of income. 
Furthermore, the expected returns to education – namely the future income of the educated 
graduate – will shape the family’s cost-benefit analysis and increase investment in education 
(Goldin and Katz 1999). Thus economic change in a given region, that increases or decreases 
demand for skilled workers, could create differential demand conditions for education across 
a country. 
Government policies may amplify or mute these demand forces. By bearing the costs of 
primary or secondary schooling, government policies will decrease the opportunity cost of 
sending children to school. Active regional policy or affirmative action, which channel more 
funds to underperforming areas, may help to level the playing field by making education 
more attractive – all else considered – in the poorest areas. In contrast, policies that rely on 
household or community co-financing to unlock government funds (also common in many 
countries), could amplify inequalities as richer communities are more able to raise the locally 
required contributions (cf. Mwiria, 1990, for an example from Kenya). When schooling is 
locally financed (whether through local taxes or community contributions), average 
educational attainment in the community as well as the strength of community cohesion are 
thought to influence the level of educational investment (Goldin and Katz, 1999). 
The Kenyan case 
How has the Kenyan government organised the supply of education? During the colonial era, 
‘ethnic favouritism’ in Kenya was institutionalised, in the sense that the educational system 
was officially segmented by race and a disproportionate share of budget resources were 
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devoted to educating the small white settler minority, and to a lesser extent, the Asian 
minority (Eshiwani 1990). Racial segregation in education was abolished in 1960. Within the 
African population, ethnic differences in attainment were also large, and strongly shaped by 
the degree of missionary penetration and integration into the colonial cash crop economy in 
the first half of the 20th century (Olson 1972; Tignor 1976; Frankema 2012). Communities 
closer to the main urban metropolises (Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu) tended to be better 
educated. 
In the early independence era, Kenya’s education policies sought first and foremost to reverse 
the racial inequities of the colonial era. Concerns about inadequate supplies of high-level 
manpower (secondary schooled graduates and beyond) were deemed by many African 
governments to be the bigger obstacle to development than an underdeveloped primary 
school system. Resources were therefore disproportionately directed to the secondary and 
tertiary level with the expectation that local resources would finance primary schooling 
(Oketch and Rolleston, 2007; Olson, 1972). In the first decade of independence, funds for 
primary school construction and teachers’ houses were raised locally, while the central 
government provided some or all recurrent outlays (teacher salaries and supplies) once the 
physical facilities had been built (Eshiwani, 1990, p.25). Kenya’s secondary schooling 
system, meanwhile, had two tracks, with a largely state-funded national or provincial 
secondary school system of higher quality and higher unit cost, and locally funded, low 
quality (and less competitive) harambee schools (Mwiria, 1990).  
With time however, policies came to stress the importance of education for national 
integration, rather than skills development alone. From a decentralized education system, 
where much of the provision was in the hands of missions and local governments, the central 
government gradually assumed greater control over educational resources. The 1968 
Education Act brought education policy and financing under the purview of the Ministry of 
Education with a view to improving distributional outcomes. The 1976 National Committee 
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on Educational Objectives and Policies made reduction of regional disparities in educational 
attainment a prime government objective. The first development plan under President’s Moi’s 
rule sought to increase educational opportunities in remote areas and among underprivileged 
groups (Kenya Development Plan 1979-1983, Part 1, p.21 and p.152). 
With this policy justification, in the 1970s central governments began to assume a greater 
share of both primary school financing while secondary school financing was spread more 
evenly across schools (Oketch, 2004; Mwiria, 1990). Primary school fees were abolished 
(although shortly thereafter they were partially reintroduced), while the independent 
harambee secondary schools were gradually incorporated into the assisted school sector. 
Under President Moi’s leadership, secondary schooling policies were designed to level 
opportunities by focusing new school construction in underserved provinces. In 1984 the 
school system was reformed, lengthening the primary school cycle from seven to eight years, 
and reducing secondary schooling from six to four years, with a view to making secondary 
schooling less elitist.  
With donor encouragement, primary education received greater budgetary attention in the 
1990s. In the 2000s, under President Kibaki, the government committed to free primary 
schooling and shifted more resources to the primary system, including through a major 
programme to support primary school construction targeting arid and semi-arid regions where 
school density is low, and in urban slums with high levels of overcrowding (Ministry of 
Education Science and Technology, 2005). Alongside the democratisation of the public 
schooling system came the growth of private primary education supply, which today accounts 
for roughly a quarter of all primary schools and 16% of primary enrolment (Ministry of 
Education Science and Technology, 2014). 
Some of these shifts are reflected in the structure of education spending. Table 1 gives the 
share of education spending by level of education, and rough relative estimates of per student 
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spending.  Primary education spending increased relative to total education spending in the 
1970s with the expansion in enrolment and abolition of fees, while secondary schooling costs 
declined proportionately. In the 1980s primary education spending declined again, as the 
expansion of secondary and tertiary enrolment increased. The 1990s saw a shift back towards 
spending on primary schooling (as strongly encouraged by the international donor 
community). Tertiary education spending increased until the 1990s (to accommodate growing 
student numbers), then declined as the costs of tertiary education were increasingly 
transferred to students. Interestingly, these shifts do not accord neatly with Presidential shifts. 
Even though ethnic inequality increases at higher levels of the educational ladder, President 
Moi did not dismantle Kenya’s regressive education structure that channelled a considerable 
share of spending to a slim and particularly ethnically skewed group of tertiary students. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
In view of these education priorities and policies, and given Kenya’s ethnic heterogeneity, 
how would we expect ethnic inequalities in access to have evolved over this time period, 
irrespective of any ethnic favouritism? 
In the colonial and early independence period, when communities and households stood for a 
greater share of school costs, demand factors seem likely to have exacerbated inequality at 
primary school level. Communities with an educational head-start are likely to invest more in 
the schooling of their children, both because they can afford larger educational outlays, and 
because a greater number of highly educated people ensures that there are more people in the 
community who place a high social value on education. Demand is also thought to be higher 
in urban areas, both because urban earnings tend to be higher, and because the high returns to 
education are more visible. Ethnically cohesive communities may also have possessed an 
advantage over multi-ethnic ones, if they proved better at mobilizing local resources or 
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petitioning for government support (Miguel, 2004). Working against these demand forces – at 
least in latter periods – was a supply of educational inputs that, officially at least, targeted 
disadvantaged regions. 
Differences at secondary level will likely amplify inequalities at primary level. In Kenya in 
the 1960s and 1970s the government sought to equalize the proportion of primary school 
graduates that transitioned to secondary school at the provincial level (Gould, 1974, p.385). 
Province-level attainment was therefore a direct function of primary completion rates. Under 
Moi’s presidency in the 1980s, provincial secondary schools began reserving 85% of school 
places for students local to the province (Mwaniki, 2014, p.5). In regions where educational 
performance was weaker, this was expected to protect local candidates from competition 
from higher performers in other parts of the country. Meanwhile, national secondary schools– 
the most competitive of Kenya’s secondary schools, albeit catering to only a small share of 
students – operated province-level quota systems, designed to equalise access (Gould, 1974; 
Mwaniki, 2014). 
 
PREDICTING ATTAINMENT GROWTH IN MULTI-ETHNIC SETTINGS 
Given these countervailing demand and supply forces, we would expect colonial era 
inequalities in education to persist for some time. In this context, what would trends in 
educational access look like if they were entirely unencumbered by ethnic favouritism, and 
how should we measure favouritism in relationship to this counterfactual? 
Absolute inequality. In one sense, level differences alone are a measure of privilege or 
favouritism irrespective of attainment growth, at least if most of the costs of primary 
schooling are financed by the central government. If average primary attainment among 
Kikuyus stayed constant at six years of schooling, while that of the Kalenjin grew from two 
to six, the government would nonetheless have spent more resources on the education of 
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Kikuyu children over the full duration of the period (assuming equal per student spending). 
Kikuyu communities would thus have received a disproportionate share of total state 
resources. This assumes however, that educational attainment is solely a function of 
government spending, which is patently not the case in most African countries. It also 
assumes that governments have the autonomy and power to radically redirect resources from 
one region or community to another. Such radical redistribution may be politically unfeasible, 
irrespective of the president’s ethnicity, given the literature from economics on loss aversion 
(Tversky and Kahnemann, 1991). In the context of Kenya moreover, this definition of 
fairness would imply that Kikuyu communities were favoured under both the Presidencies of 
Kenyatta and Moi, given that their attainment levels, and thus presumably state per capita 
spend on education, were higher for the Kikuyus than for any other group under both 
presidencies. 
Absolute change. If we assume that all communities clamour for continued attainment 
growth, and depend largely on government support to meet this demand, we might instead 
compare absolute gains in attainment. Rather than seeking to equalize attainment levels, we 
assume that the government will try and equalize the amount of additional, new resources it 
delivers to each group. In other words, we would consider the situation fair if, over a given 
period, the Kalenjin attainment rate grew from two to three years, while the Kikuyu rate grew 
from six to seven. In this scenario the absolute attainment gap between groups remains 
constant. This measure, however, loses relevance when as one group begins to approach the 
upper limit. If the Kalenjin attainment grows from two to three years while the Kikuyu rate, 
already nearing the maximum number of primary years of schooling, stays constant, the 
Kalenjin group would be considered the favoured group. 
Percentage change. Alternatively, if we place more weight on demand as the driver of 
attainment growth and assume a laissez-faire system, we might expect the absolute gains to 
be largest in the communities that already have a head-start. Where few people are 
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benefitting from schooling already, additional demand for schooling and social pressure to 
send children to school may be low (cf. Olson 1972, for an example from Kenya).4 Groups 
with higher attainment levels, conversely, may have larger numbers of expectant children 
clamouring to go to school. Moreover, it may well be that such groups are located in regions 
where returns to education are higher (more urbanized regions for instance), amplifying these 
demand forces. We may therefore speculate that in the absence of government intervention 
the growth rate in the years of schooling would be equal across groups. In other words, we 
would expect that in a system unencumbered by ethnic favouritism, both groups might see 
attainment growth of for instance 10% in a given year, from 2 years to 2.2 years for the 
Kalenjin for instance, and 6 years to 6.6 years for the Kikuyu. However, measuring 
percentage change suffers from the same upper bound problem as when measuring absolute 
change. Once a group approaches the upper limit, the rate of growth must slow. It also has the 
perverse implication that absolute gains will continue to be largest among the high achieving 
groups.  
An alternative approach is to assume a quadratic growth function, where for each ethnic 
group, the rate of attainment growth slows as values approach the upper limit. As each ethnic 
group has a different starting point, we would predict different rates of attainment growth 
across groups, depending on where the group lies on the curve. However, this makes the 
notion of favouritism far less intuitive, as favouritism is defined in relationship to a complex 
counterfactual, where levels and rates of attainment growth will vary across ethnic groups 
and time. It is conceivable that a group would be considered favoured even if its attainment 
levels are stagnant while other groups experience growth.  
Achievement and improvement indices. Alternatively, if we assume that incremental gains in 
schooling are harder to make at a higher level of achievement, i.e., we assume convergence 
 
4 In predominantly pastoral communities for instance, the uptake of education has lagged agrarian regions, 
despite large governmental and non-governmental investments. 
16 
 
as the default, then improvement indices offer an alternative measurement approach. These 
functions are designed for measures that have ‘asymptotic limits’, with minimum and 
maximum achievement levels, such as years of primary schooling on infant deaths per 1,000 
(Kakwani 1993). Sen (1981) has proposed that we measure the achievement as the percentage 
decrease of the difference between initial level and upper limit. Thus a gain from two to three 
years of schooling is measured as a change of one year, over a gap of five years to the upper 
limit of seven years, for an achievement index of 0.2, while a gain from six to seven (where 
seven is the maximum), gives an achievement of one. 
This method has primarily been used to measure health variables such as life expectancy and 
infant mortality. It is less obvious that the relative achievement in approaching universal 
primary education is quite as stark as in the health example. To give an example, in a country 
with a seven-year primary school system, Sen’s model would consider the raising of primary 
attainment from six to seven years a greater achievement than raising it from zero to six. The 
former group, in this example, would be the favoured group. 
Other dimensions of ethnic favouritism. Most of the measures of ethnic favouritism focus on 
quantity of education provided; how many students across different groups have benefit from 
educational access. It is also possible that politicians favour their ethnic kin by increasing the 
quality of education supplied, by, for instance, improving the quality of educational facilities 
or disproportionately deploying trained teachers to a given region. Existing literature suggests 
that this quality channel is less politically attractive than the quantity channel, given the 
importance politicians tend to place on visible quantifiable achievements such as school 
construction (Keefer and Khemani 2005; Harding and Stasavage 2014). Nonetheless, it is 
worth recognizing that a focus on more easily measured dimensions of educational benefits 
such as years of schooling could mask other means by which groups or individuals are 
favoured. 
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Perception indicators? Irrespective of statistical models or definitions of fairness, for these 
definitions of ethnic favouritism to hold analytical relevance, they also need to be anchored in 
popular perceptions and understandings of favouritism. The reason political scientists study 
ethnic favouritism is not because of normative notions of fairness, but because they assume 
that ethnic favouritism or discrimination influences political behaviour, by fuelling support 
for politicians or grievances that may result in poor policy outcomes, conflictual elections or 
outright conflict. Yet imagine a situation where the Kikuyu attainment rate has grown from 6 
to 7 years and the Kalenjin from 2 to 3.5 years, which, using an improvement index or 
assuming a counterfactual quadratic growth path as the counterfactual, would lead us to the 
conclusion that the Kikuyu ethnic group was favoured. Would the average layman, even if 
presented with these statistics, perceive this to be favouritism, or are absolute level 
differences or absolute change, regardless of their causes, a greater source of contention? 
Furthermore, could smaller growth rate differentials be perceived by the public with any 
accuracy, in the absence of detailed analysis and high statistical literacy? 
 
REVISITING THE EVIDENCE OF ETHNIC FAVOURITISM IN EXISTING PAPERS 
How do the existing papers on ethnic favouritism model their counterfactual world absent of 
ethnic favouritism? Kramon and Posner (2016) offer three alternative models. Their first and 
model, also replicated by Li (2018), predicts the number of years of schooling of a 
respondent, conditional on being of school age during the tenure of a co-ethnic president and 
controlling for time fixed effects and ethnic group fixed effects. Based on this model their 
results suggest that being a co-ethnic of the president during one’s school-aged years boosts 
one’s number of years of primary schooling by 6%, and secondary schooling by 12%.  
By including a simple ethnic group fixed effect, the authors are assuming that in the absence 
of ethnic favouritism, we would observe a constant absolute gap in years of schooling 
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between groups and over time. Given that primary attainment levels in Kenya are 
approaching the upper limit,5 this is a problematic assumption. It risks confusing the decrease 
in the size of this ethnic dummy, owing to convergence effects, with ethnic favouritism. This 
is illustrated  in Figure 1, which shows that the absolute gap in mean years of primary 
schooling between the Kikuyu and national average was higher during the Kenyatta period 
than the Moi period and vice versa for the Kalenjin, but that this gap was largely a 
consequence of higher Kikuyu attainment under colonial rule. All the narrowing in the 
attainment gap happened during Kenyatta’s presidency, while the gap between the two 
groups stayed constant under Moi’s presidency. While it would be accurate to describe the 
inequalities under Kenyatta as larger than under Moi, it is hard to see how this can be 
attributed to President Kenyatta’s disproportionate spending in Kikuyu regions. Rather, 
Kenyatta’s presidency was characterised by educational catch-up by non-Kikuyu ethnic 
groups.  
In a second specification, designed to control for the possible effects of convergence, Kramon 
and Posner (2016) introduce a linear ethnic-group specific time trend in addition to year and 
ethnic group fixed effects. Introducing a linear time trend assumes that all ethnic groups will 
see steady growth in years of schooling, although these rates of growth are allowed to differ 
between groups. Ethnic favouritism is then measured by examining whether the annual rate 
of change in years of schooling for a given group is smaller or larger than its mean during a 
period when the president was of its ethnicity. 
However, this tweak to the model does not overcome the convergence problem just discussed 
in relation to using ethnic group fixed effects. Clearly the attainment growth rate will slow as 
groups approach eight years of primary schooling (or four years of secondary schooling). 
Because the Kikuyu start butting against the years of primary school ceiling earlier than the 
 
5 The upper limit was 7 years up until 1984, and then extended to 8 years. 
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Kalenjin, their rate of attainment growth slows more quickly under Moi’s presidency than it 
does for the Kalenjin, and this will therefore be identified as ethnic favouritism in the model. 
The third specification offers a more defensible counterfactual. Rather than assuming that 
years of schooling will grow linearly, it assumes that each group follows its own quadratic 
time trend. In other words, the growth in years of schooling is predicted to take a parabolic 
form. In every ethnic group, attainment will grow faster at lower levels of attainment and 
slow down as the attainment level approaches 8 years of primary schooling. The model 
allows the pace of growth and pace of slow-down to vary by group. This specification is 
similar to the model used by Franck and Rainer (2013), who use DHS data to examine ethnic 
favouritism in relation to ethnic group- and survey-specific quadratic time trends.6 They, like 
Kramon and Posner, find an educational advantage for presidential co-ethnics in Kenya, 
relative to the predicted quadratic growth trend in primary schooling. 
While this approach takes better cognizance of convergence forces, it creates a very abstract 
notion of ethnic favouritism, defined as a rate of educational attainment growth higher than 
what would be predicted by an ethnic-group specific quadratic time trend. This can give some 
unintuitive interpretations. Depending on the trend, we may capture an ethnic favouritism 
effect even where the favoured group sees no attainment growth at all. Over longer periods of 
time, moreover, it is not clear that quadratic time trends will approximate the growth path of 
years of primary education. 
This conceptual concern aside, however, we find that the results reported using these models 
are highly unstable. To demonstrate this, we replicate Kramon and Posner’s model using 
quadratic group-specific time trends and then subject it to a number of robustness tests, as 
seen in Table 2. The results of a first, ‘narrow’ replication, that seeks as far as possible to 
replicate the original model, validate the results reported by Kramon and Posner. The 
 
6 Franck and Rainer’s (2012) main results consider whether a respondent has some, or has completed primary 
education, rather than measuring years of primary schooling. 
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coefficient is positive and significant.7 This result suggests that students educated under a 
coethnic president receive a boost in average number of years of primary schooling of 0.18 
years, which corresponds to a roughly 3% increase relative to average years of primary 
schooling, or 0.07 standard deviations. 
However, Kramon and Posner’s dataset, for unexplained reasons, constructs a birth year 
variable by subtracting a respondent’s age from the survey year, despite the fact that the DHS 
contains a precise birth year variable. In Model 2 we replace the birth year, match, time and 
cohort variables with ones constructed based on a respondent’s actual reported birth year 
instead of the estimated birth year. This small adjustment reduces the size of the match 
coefficient and it loses statistical significance. In Model 3 we expand the sample using data 
from the 2014 DHS, which has become available since the publication of Kramon and 
Posner’s paper. This roughly doubles the sample size. Under this specification the match 
variable changes signs and remains insignificant. In Model 4 we drop all the control variables 
(as the motivation for their inclusion is dubious, as discussed in Appendix 4). This has no 
major impact on the results. In Model 5 we only include respondents aged 20 or above, to 
avoid biases resulting from ethnic group differences in average primary completion age.8 The 
match coefficient remains negative and insignificant. 
Lastly we extent the time period under review to include birth cohorts born in 1950 or later, 
and thus some respondents educated in the last years of colonial rule. This alteration does 
give us a positive and significant match coefficient, albeit of smaller size. This suggests that 
the results are driven by the period of transition from colonial to independent rule. Inclusion 
or exclusion of the cohorts educated around independence seem to drive the size and 
 
7 Note that our sample is slightly smaller than Kramon and Posner’s (47,146 versus 47,275 observations). We 
were unable to account for this very slight difference. 
8 In Appendix 3 we show that by having a relatively low age cut-off for inclusion in the sample introduces 
sampling biases. Many students have yet to complete their primary education until late into their teens and the 
ethnic origins of the overaged versus ‘correctly’ aged primary students differs. 
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significance of the coefficient.9 Given the big expansion of educational provision around this 
time and changing policy priorities, it seems hasty to attribute an increase in the Kikuyu share 
of students in these transition years solely to ethnic favouritism by President Kenyatta. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 presents our next set of results that replicate Kramon and Posner’s model using 
censuses, rather than DHS data, which increases the sample size to the millions. The first 
model replicates Kramon and Posner’s model with quadratic group-specific time trends as 
closely as possible, but excludes religious and birth place controls as these cannot be 
constructed from the census dataset. This model shows a positive and statistically significant 
ethnic match dummy of comparable magnitude to that found by Kramon and Posner. In 
Model 2 we restrict the sample to respondents aged 20 or above. This reduces the coefficient 
size slightly and the results are now only significant at the 10% level. Yet moving the start 
date of the sample by just one year, to those born from 1955 as opposed to from 1954, brings 
the coefficient down in size and it loses significance. Conversely, including more colonial era 
cohorts, by extending the window back to 1950, increases the coefficient size. As in the 
previous analysis then, these results are driven by the period of transition to independence. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
We can illustrate these results visually, by plotting the predicted years of primary schooling 
for the Kikuyu in a world absent of ethnic favouritism (i.e., setting the ethnic match dummy 
to zero). This predicted trend is then compared to the actual ethnic group trend in Figure 2. 
 
9 The reason the coefficient loses significance in model 2 is that actual birth year excludes a number of 
respondents born in the latter half of 1953. 
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We focus on the Kikuyu as it appears that the educational performance of this ethnic group in 
the early independence period is driving the results. The actual Kikuyu trend (black line), is 
shown alongside the predicted trends using the three alternative start years from Modules 2-4 
above using census data: 1954, 1955 and 1950. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
This illustrates visually how sensitive the results are to educational performance among the 
cohorts born just around 1954. There appears to be something of a kink-point in the data, 
with a take-off in the educational growth for the Kikuyu cohorts born 1955 and later. 
Consequently, the predicted quadratic time trend is sensitive to the starting year. It tracks the 
actual trend more closely when we model from a peak start year (1955), and performs worse 
when we use the trough years 1954 or 1950. Another confounding factor apparent in this 
figure is that the difference between the Kikuyu actual and predicted trends in the Kenyatta 
era is driven largely by trough years, which are a result of age heaping.10 Thus the deviation 
between actual and predicted trend may partly be a consequence of less age heaping among 
Kikuyu respondents.  
Moreover, contrary to what we would expect if these trends were driven by ethnic 
favouritism, there is no obvious break in trend for cohorts born around 1969, which 
corresponds to the crucial transition from President Kenyatta to President Moi. To examine 
this further, we introduce two placebo tests (Table 3, Models 5 and Model 6).11 Following 
Kramon and Posner, these models ‘incorrectly’ code the transition from Kenyatta to Moi’s 
 
10 The reason for this is that uneducated respondents are less likely to know their exact age. These less educated 
respondents will therefore cluster on rounded age numbers (5s and 10s), and pull down the average years of 
schooling among those cohorts, giving a zigzagging trend. 
11 These placebo tests are modelled on those used by Kramon and Posner (pp.19-20). 
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presidency as having happened three years prior to the actual transition (Model 5), and three 
years after the actual transition (Model 6) (using Model 4 as the base specification). In both 
cases the match dummy coefficient remains significant, and in the first specification it 
increases in size and significance. Thus the placebo test fails to demonstrate an effect of the 
identified presidential transition year on primary school enrolment. 
Favouritism in secondary schooling 
Next we turn to examining ethnic group educational trends in secondary schooling. While 
Franck and Rainer (2013) focus only on primary school completion, Kramon and Posner 
(2016) examine secondary school attainment using the same set of specifications as for 
primary schooling to measure favouritism. They argue that their stronger results at secondary 
level supports their thesis, as ethnic patronage is more likely to manifest itself at secondary 
level where returns to schooling are higher and degree of state subsidization larger. 
However, this approach to measuring ethnic favouritism overlooks the impact of primary 
schooling on secondary outcomes. Given that only students who have completed primary 
school are eligible for secondary schooling, there is a path dependency to secondary school 
inequalities, which makes it problematic to consider secondary attainment independently of 
primary attainment. It would therefore be more appropriate to measure favouritism in 
secondary education in relation to the number of eligible pupils in each ethnic group, rather 
than the entire population. 
Although the censuses and DHS do not ask respondents whether they passed their primary 
school exams, we can use attendance in the final year of primary schooling as a proxy for 
primary completion, assuming that ethnic differences in pass rates do not vary markedly over 
time. Figure 3a therefore measures average years of secondary schooling by ethnic group 
conditional on having at least seven years of primary schooling, while Figure 3b measures 
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this transition rate in relationship to the national mean.12 In other words, we are examining 
what share of primary school completers from each ethnic group obtain secondary education. 
The differences in performance between the groups are much smaller once differences in 
primary schooling are controlled for. The Kikuyu retain a small advantage throughout the 
period, but the gap between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin transition rates declined primarily under 
Kenyatta’s presidency, not Moi’s. Kikuyu primary school completers continue to maintain an 
advantage over the Kalenjin and other groups throughout Moi’s presidency, and this 
advantage increases among the cohorts educated under the last years of President Moi’s 
presidency. 
When comparing the transition rate across ethnic groups, the presence of a convergence 
effect is less obvious. Figure 3a does not suggest that the transition rate has followed either a 
linear or quadratic time trend. To test for a possible ethnic favouritism effect, we therefore 
revert to Kramon and Posner’s base specification, which controls only for group and time 
fixed effects (assuming no group-specific time trends). Results are given in Appendix Table 5 
using the DHS and census data. The DHS dataset does yield give a positive and significant 
coefficient, but this coefficient loses significance when we limit the sample to the Kenyatta 
and Moi presidencies only, while the census specification gives a negative (and statistically 
insignificant) coefficient on the presidential ethnic match variable. This does not constitute 
clear evidence of ethnic favouritism. 
Another piece of evidence allows us to bring schooling performance into the picture, and 
examine whether Kalenjin primary completers faced lower barriers to secondary school entry 
under President Moi, through either favouritism that lowered the grade point average required 
for Kalenjin candidates to enter secondary school, or a higher supply of secondary relative to 
 
12 A data problem is that the school reforms of 1984, which extended primary schooling in Kenya from 7 to 8 
years. This may interfere with the results for the early 1970s, as we may not be able to pinpoint the exact 
respondents who completed their primary schooling under the old and new system. For simplicity, the figure 
therefore uses 7 years of primary schooling as the measure of ‘completion’ throughout the entire period. 
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primary schools in predominantly Kalenjin districts. For a single year, 1989, we have district-
level data on not only primary and secondary enrolment, but also the average student 
performance on the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE). We can therefore 
examine the rate of transition from primary to secondary school at the district level, by 
measuring the share of secondary students to primary school exam candidates, while 
controlling for average district-level exam performance. This allows us to measure whether 
students from a particular ethnic region of Kenya face a lower or higher threshold to 
secondary school entry than others. 
In Table 4 we present the results of regressing the average district KCPE score against the 
ratio of secondary school students to KCPE candidates by district, and include dummy 
variables for Kalenjin and Kikuyu districts.13 If Kalenjin districts were favoured under 
President Moi through the provision of more secondary school inputs or easier access to 
national secondary schools, we should expect to see a disproportionate share of Kalenjin 
students transitioning from primary to secondary schools and thus a positive coefficient on 
the Kalenjin dummy, while the Kikuyu dummy would be negative. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The results do not confirm these predictions. The Kalenjin transition rate is lower than that 
predicted by the model, although the coefficient is insignificant. There is no evidence that 
students in Kalenjin regions had a higher rate of educational progression than students in 
other regions. The Kikuyu dummy is likewise insignificant, albeit positive. It does not 
appear, therefore, that there was any absolute lowering of the bar for Kalenjin primary 
 
13 As the secondary school enrolment data is not disaggregated by form, we divide the total enrolment (Form 1-
4) by 4. As both the primary and secondary data is from 1989, we make the simplifying assumption that district-
level enrolment did not vary substantially between 1985 and 1989. 
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completers under Moi’s Presidency, although in the absence of time series data we cannot 
measure whether the Kalenjin or Kikuyu transition rate changed following the presidential 
transition. 
This data source also allows us to draw some tentative inferences about differences in 
educational quality across ethnic regions of Kenya. One alternative mechanism through 
which favouritism may operate is through differences in the quality of education supplied, 
rather than the quantity. The 1989 cross-sectional data allows us to look at differences in 
average candidate performance across ethnic regions, which can be thought of as a proxy for 
school quality. As seen in Appendix Table 6, the 1989 KCPE performance data shows 
considerable variation in average KCPE score across regions, although the variation in 
school-level KCPE averages within districts is more than twice as high as the variation 
between ethnic regions (measured by a coefficient of variation). Moreover, much of this 
variation is probably a consequence of differences in household income and educational 
status. With a few exceptions (Turkana, Mombasa), students tend to score higher in richer 
parts of Kenya where educational attainment is higher to begin with, and vice versa. In this 
regard, Kalenjin districts do not appear to be major outliers. 
 
FAVOURITISM IN THE SUPPLY OF SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS?   
One of the compelling aspects of Kramon and Posner’s (2016) paper is that it offers a clean 
causal explanation for how ethnic patronage shapes educational inequalities. The authors 
argue that these ethnic inequalities in educational outcomes are supply driven, with, for 
instance, a Kikuyu-led government directing more state resources, such as the construction of 
schools, to Kikuyu districts. To test this, they examine the number of schools per district and 
conclude that school construction disproportionately benefitted districts in predominantly 
Kikuyu/Kalenjin districts under their respective coethnic presidents’ tenure. 
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However, a school to school-aged population ratio is only an appropriate measure of political 
favour under certain assumptions: firstly, that school construction was financed by the 
government, and secondly, that schools are roughly uniform in size. On closer inspection, 
neither of these assumptions hold. 
In the first decades of independence, primary school construction in Kenya was primarily 
financed by the local community. It remained official policy until at least the 1980s that the 
development of physical facilities was the responsibility of school committees and parent 
associations, not the central government (Eshiwani, 1990, p.25). Some may have been 
financed through donations by politicians through harambee funds, which may indirectly 
have come from political spoils, but a community’s number of wealthy harambee benefactors 
is likely to have been a function of far much more than the President’s ethnicity. In latter 
decades aid has also been an important source of financing for school construction, which is 
presumably less susceptible to ethnic targeting. Furthermore, although hard to verify, the data 
used by Kramon and Posner does not appear to distinguish between public and private 
primary schools. By 2014, roughly a quarter of Kenyan primary schools were private. Private 
provision has been growing over time but varies considerably across counties. In Nairobi, 
83% of primary schools were private in 2014, compared to 5% in West Pokot (Ministry of 
Education Science and Technology, 2014). 
Nor are Kenyan primary schools uniform in size. Unsurprisingly, denser and wealthier areas 
tend to have larger primary schools. The average number of students per school across 
Kenyan counties in 2014 ranged from 926 in Nairobi to 219 in Baringo and Tharaka-Nithi. It 
is therefore difficult to deduce, from data on the number of school alone, whether more 
schooling opportunities were being created in some districts relative to others. 
An arguably less problematic measure of educational supply is the number of teachers in a 
given district. Unlike school construction, the Kenyan central government has been the main 
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source of finance for teacher’s salaries in public schools since independence. Data on number 
of teachers is available at province, if not always at district level. In Table 6 we therefore 
calculate the primary school-aged population to teacher ratio for each province in Kenya for a 
set of benchmark years, close a the year of presidential transition. Provinces roughly map 
onto at least some ethnic regions in Kenya, with the Kikuyu predominant in the Central 
province, and the Kalenjin comprising just under half the population of the Rift Valley. While 
cruder than a district measure, we would expect that ethnic favouritism in the supply of 
teachers would result in a disproportionate reduction in the population to teacher ratio in 
Central and Rift Valley provinces under the presidencies of Kenyatta and Moi respectively. 
Note that at the primary level, the 1966 and 1977 data does not distinguish between public 
and primary schools, but accounts suggest that private primary schooling catered to a very 
small share of African students in the 1960s and 1970s.14 Data for 2003 and 2014 records the 
number of public school teachers only. Population data is taken from the censuses for cohorts 
aged 6-13. We interpolate between census years assuming a constant rate of population 
growth. The results are provided in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Consistent with the attainment trends, the teacher to population ratios have converged over 
time. Over the course of Kenyatta’s presidency (1966-77) the ratio of school-aged children to 
teachers dropped substantially across the country, but the Kikuyu-dominated Central 
province registered the smallest improvement. Over the course of Moi’s presidency the 
population to teacher ratio stayed relatively constant, with small improvements in the Central, 
Eastern and Rift Valley provinces, while the teacher density fell dramatically in Nairobi 
 
14 Kinyanjui (1981) identified 14 private primary schools in Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Kisumu in 1976 
(7%), but these catered primarily to expatriates and Asian and European Kenyans, only 19% of the students 
were African Kenyans in 1972. 
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(presumably on account of rapid population growth and increased private primary schooling 
in the capital). Under Kibaki’s presidency the population to teacher ratio increased even 
further in Nairobi, rose slightly in the Central, Eastern and Rift Valley, and remained 
relatively constant elsewhere. The coefficient of variation fell once more. Note that the main 
outlier region throughout the postcolonial era has been the North-Eastern province, where the 
teacher supply remains dramatically lower than in the rest of the country. Here too, however, 
the ratio has improved over time.15 Taken in sum, this does not provide strong evidence of 
favouritism. Kikuyu districts had unusually low rates of teacher growth under Kikuyu 
presidents. Kalenjin areas did experience comparatively strong growth in the teacher supply 
under Moi’s presidency, but as with attainment, this is hard to distinguish from a broader 
catch-up effect. 
CONCLUSION  
This paper has reviewed some of the evidence of ethnic favouritism in African educational 
provision, much of which rests on the Kenyan example. Revisiting the Kenyan case shows 
the available evidence to be far from conclusive. When analysed descriptively, the trends in 
ethnic group educational attainment do not conform to any intuitive models of ethnic 
favouritism, and the regression results prove highly sensitive to the nature of the sample and 
years under review. The relative performance of the Kikuyu ethnic group declined under the 
Kikuyu presidency of Kenyatta, while the Kalenjin group saw their relative performance 
improve prior to the transition to a Kalenjin presidency. There is no evidence of clear ethnic 
group discontinuities around the time of presidential shifts. 
In both the enrolment and input analysis, perhaps the more striking omission from the ethnic 
favouritism story is the noteworthy convergence in primary attainment across Kenya’s larger 
ethnic groups (see Appendix Figure 7). Among Kenyan millenials – the last cohorts included 
 
15 Note also that the 2009 population of the North-Eastern Province suggests an unlikely rate of population 
growth, and may be over-estimated. 
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in our sample born around 1989 – average years of primary schooling do not differ markedly 
across major ethnic groups, with a range from 6.3 (Kalenjin) to 7.4 (Kikuyu). In contrast, for 
the first cohorts to be educated in independent Kenya, the average years of schooling ranged 
from 3.3 to 5.4. The educational divide has, however, up until recently grown more marked 
between the larger ethnic groups in the Kenyan ‘core’, relative to smaller groups at the 
‘preiphery’, particularly groups that retain pastoralism, notably the Somali, Turkana and 
Masai. While these gaps may be cause for concern, today’s educational fault line does not 
map neatly onto the main political divides in Kenyan party politics.  
In the Kenyan case the changing ethnic group attainment patterns are very hard to ascribe to 
government action in the first place, but are, if anything, more consistent with the idea that 
governments sought to balance access to popular, broadly-accessed services such as primary 
education roughly equally among regions. Yet one should also be careful not to read too 
much government agency into these patterns. Demand for education has been strong across 
most ethnic groups, and educational attainment growth, particularly at primary level, was 
largely driven by grassroots action rather than top-down planning. Furthermore, the rates of 
convergence in educational attainment are themselves conditional on the rate of attainment 
growth. During the periods when the educational system was expanding rapidly – which 
coincides with periods of strong economic growth – convergence also tends to be more rapid. 
The rapid educational convergence under Kenyatta, and slowdown under Moi, may have 
more to do with the changing economic conditions in Kenya than with any explicit 
educational policy shift. 
A further consideration, not discussed in the reviewed papers, is the extent to which citizens 
of Kenya – or indeed any country – would be able to gauge these levels of supposed ethnic 
favouritism. It is usually assumed that ethnic favouritism serves a political purpose, by 
rewarding and cementing support for a leader from within his or her core constituency. But 
for this strategy to work citizens have to have a reasonably accurate perception of the 
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privileged bestowed, or conversely withheld, from them. In a context of rising educational 
attainment across the entire country, it seems unlikely that the average Kenyan citizen would 
have any ability to judge the marginal advantage or penalty accrued by their ethnic group – 
particularly if the measure of favouritism is conditioned on a hypothetical rate of educational 
convergence. Indeed, as Carlson (2018) argues based on experimental and Afrobarometer 
evidence, perceptions of favouritism may be greater in situations when individuals lack 
access to information about government expenditures and instead rely upon informal 
comparisons with members of other groups. Regardless of their historical causes, it may well 
be that absolute inequality between groups is more politically salient than relative rates of 
change under a particular presidency. 
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Figure 1. Kenya: primary attainment by ethnic group 
a. Average years of primary schooling by group b. Primary schooling by group relative to natl. 
mean 
c. Primary schooling by group, difference to 
mean 
 
 
Note: Nairobi-born respondents excluded (constitute <2%); droplines mark cohorts who are expected to have received most of their schooling under the given ‘regime’. 
Source: Pooled data from Kenyan 1969-2009 censuses, Minnesota Population Center, 2018. 
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Figure 2. Kikuyu years of primary schooling by birth cohort, predicted versus actual 
 
Source: pooled data from Kenyan 1969-2009 censuses, Minnesota Population Center, 2018. 
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Figures 3a and 3b. Average years of secondary schooling among all respondents with at least 7 years of primary schooling 
 
Note: Nairobi-born respondents excluded (constitute <2%); droplines mark cohorts who are expected to have received most of their schooling under the given ‘regime’. 
Source: Pooled data from Kenyan 1969-2009 censuses, Minnesota Population Center, 2018. 
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Table 1. Education expenditure by level of education and decade 
 1971 1980 1992 2000 2011 
Expenditure by level of education, as % of government expenditure on education 
Primary 46 60 51 68 39 
Secondary 34 17 20 17 43 
Tertiary 15 18 20 12 13 
Per student expenditure as multiple of expenditure per primary student 
Primary 1 1 1 1 1 
Secondary 8 3 3 2 6 
Tertiary 36 46 31 15 16 
Source: Expenditure: World Development Indicators, 2019; Student enrolment: Simson, 2019. 
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Table 2. Regression results: ethnic match effect on years of primary schooling, using 
quadratic group-specific time trends, pooled DHS data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Primary 
Years 
Primary 
Years 
Primary 
Years 
Primary 
Years 
Primary 
Years 
Primary 
Years 
             
Ethnic match 0.185*** 0.0642 -0.0641 -0.0549 -0.0478 0.0986* 
 (0.0431) (0.0545) (0.0551) (0.0524) (0.0541) (0.0572) 
Controls       
Religion YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Place of birth (urban/rur) YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Gender YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 47,146 46,729 90,645 90,645 70,647 72,943 
R-squared 0.249 0.245 0.241 0.158 0.262 0.270 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Notes: 
Model 1: 'Narrow' replication of KP model in Appendix B, Column 2, Row 1 
Model 2: As M1 but replaces birth year variable with actual recorded birth year 
Model 3: As M2 but adds data from 2014 DHS 
Model 4: As M3 but excluding all controls 
Model 5: As M3 but restricts age of sampled respondents to >=20 
Model 6: As M4 but extends birth cohorts included to those born in 1950 or later 
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Table 3. Regression results: ethnic match effect on years of primary schooling, using 
quadratic group-specific time trends, pooled census data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Primary 
Years 
Primary 
Years 
Primary 
Years 
Primary 
Years 
Primary 
Years 
Primary 
Years 
             
District ethnic match 0.139** 0.113* 0.0424 0.150**   
 (0.0553) (0.0545) (0.0560) (0.0393)   
District ethnic match 
placebos     0.167*** 0.124** 
     (0.0365) (0.0545) 
Controls       
Religion NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Place of birth (urban/rur) NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Gender NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Weights YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,114,944 2,293,126 2,228,676 2,455,153 2,455,153 2,455,153 
R-squared 0.137 0.148 0.139 0.167 0.162 0.162 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Notes: 
Model 1: ‘Close’ replication of KP model in Appendix B, Column 2, Row 1 (birth cohorts 1954-95) 
Model 2: As M1 but restricts age of sampled respondents to >=20 
Model 3: As M2 but narrows birth cohort inclusion to those born in 1955 or after 
Model 4: As M2 but extends birth cohort inclusion to those born in 1950 or after 
Model 5: As M4 but using a placebo match dummy where the K-M transition is moved forward 3 years 
Model 5: As M4 but using a placebo match dummy where the K-M transition is moved backward 3 years 
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Table 4. Regression results: effect of average district KCPE score on the share of 
secondary students to primary completers 
VARIABLES 
District rate of primary-secondary 
transition (1989) 
Average KCPE score 0.00199** 0.00209** 0.00174* 
 (0.000787) (0.000781) (0.000885) 
Kalenjin dummy  -0.0727  
  (0.0527)  
Kikuyu dummy   0.0362 
   (0.0562) 
Constant -0.289 -0.312 -0.208 
 (0.270) (0.267) (0.299) 
    
Observations 40 40 40 
R-squared 0.145 0.186 0.154 
Source: Data assembled from Kenafric Industrial Services, 1991, Kenya’s Primary and Secondary Schools 
Network: A Statistical Presentation, sponsored by Christian Churches. 
Notes: Lamu excluded from the sample due to missing data. Rate of transition calculated by dividing ¼ of total 
secondary enrolment in 1989 the number of 1989 KCPE candidates. All models are estimated using OLS.  
*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Primary school teacher supply by province 
 
Teachers by 
province   School-aged population (6-13)  
population to 
teacher ratio  Pop to teacher ratio, % change 
Province 1966 1977 2003* 2014* 1966 1977 2003 2014 1966 1977 2003 2014 
‘Kenyatta 
era’ 
(1966-77) 
‘Moi era’ 
(1977-2003) 
‘Kibaki 
era’  
(2003-14) 
Central 8,183  16,571  24,689  22,041  346,987  569,251  803,358  921,576  42 34 33 42 -19% -5% 28% 
Coast 1,969  5,758  11,217  14,482  173,813  265,542  584,314  767,204  88 46 52 53 -48% 13% 2% 
Eastern 6,384  18,001  37,839  40,584  403,449  622,737  1,149,693  1,372,019  63 35 30 34 -45% -12% 11% 
Nairobi 1,609  2,935  4,390  4,278  70,018  66,880  341,424  488,556  44 23 78 114 -48% 241% 47% 
North-East 69  330  1,094  2,882  55,237  81,864  361,274  779,028  801 248 330 270 -69% 33% -18% 
Nyanza 6,014  16,458  29,936  35,646  468,032  618,661  1,115,305  1,374,139  78 38 37 39 -52% -1% 3% 
Rift 5,176  16,681  46,960  54,553  460,244  719,435  1,886,964  2,572,519  89 43 40 47 -51% -7% 17% 
Western 4,118  13,039  21,443  27,156  300,511  432,318  902,130  1,136,232  73 33 42 42 -55% 27% -1% 
Total 33,522  89,773  177,568  201,622  2,278,290  3,380,717  7,144,462  9,411,273  68 38 40 47 -45% 7% 16% 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation  
   
    1.6 1.2 1.3 1.0    
*Teachers in public schools only. 
Sources: MoE Triennial Survey, 1964-66 and annual report for 1966; MoE annual report 1977; Data from 2003 from Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Education & UNESCO, 
(2012) Kenya education for all evaluation, end decade assessment 2000-10, Table 3.4; MoEST, Kenya 2014 basic education statistical booklet. Population data projected 
from censuses 1969, 1979, 1999 and 2009.
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Appendix 1. DHS versus census data compared 
The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and census data each have different strengths and 
weaknesses. The main advantage of the DHS is that it measures self-reported ethnic identity, while its 
disadvantage is a skewed gender and age sample (as the DHS is based on interviews with women of 
reproductive age and a subset of their husbands). Relative to the census, the sample size is also 
considerably smaller (n = ~ 70,000, compared to n = ~  2,500,000). 
The census, in contrast to the DHS, does not make self-reported ethnicity data available. The census 
results therefore rest on an ethnicity proxy. Respondents are classified as belonging to the ethnic 
group that dominates their county of birth. As many counties are relatively ethnically homogenous, 
this is a credible assumption, although it does introduce room for error. In particular, it does mean that 
people born in the main urban metropolises, Nairobi and Mombasa, cannot be classified, and are 
included in a residual ‘mixed ethnicity region’ category instead. (Note however that the share of 
people born in these urban areas is still comparatively small, at roughly 2% in Nairobi and 1% in 
Mombasa, in our full pooled sample). 
In the figures below we compare the two samples to see how closely they align. We plot the average 
years of primary schooling using the ethnic group categories applied in the paper (Kikuyu, Kalenjin 
and other). Female and male samples are treated separately (due to the gender skew in the DHS 
sample). 
The trends across the two data samples are similar, although the DHS systematically estimates higher 
average years of schooling. Unsurprisingly, the volatility in trend is higher for the oldest cohorts, and 
particularly so for the smaller DHS sample and more so for the male than female sample (as the DHS 
male sample is smaller). However, there are no systematic differences between the two samples that 
seem to align with Kenya’s presidential transitions (cohorts born after 1954 or 1967). 
Note that both samples show signs of age heaping – we see troughs on round ages (5s and 10s), as age 
heaping is more common among the less educated. Because the census is undertaken at regular 10 
year intervals, the census age heaping effects are more regular than for the unevenly spaced DHSs. 
Our main figures utilise the census instead of DHS data, given the larger sample size (and thus less 
year-to-year fluctuations), and gender balance.    
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Appendix Figure 1. Years of primary schooling by birth year, census and DHS data compared 
Female Sample 
Kikuyu  Kalenjin Other* 
 
Male Sample 
Kikuyu Kalenjin Other* 
 
* Nairobi-born respondents excluded. 
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Appendix Figure 2. Kenya: secondary attainment by ethnic group 
a. Average years of secondary schooling by group b. Secondary schooling by group relative to mean c. Secondary schooling by group, difference to mean 
 
 
Notes: Include respondents >=24; Nairobi-born respondents excluded; vertical lines mark those cohorts most likely educated in the colonial era, under President Kenyatta and 
under President Moi, respectively. 
Source: Pooled data from Kenyan 1969-2009 censuses, Minnesota Population Center, 2018. 
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Appendix 3. Age of school attendance 
The papers measuring ethnic favouritism in primary education rest on assumptions about the age at 
which children begin and finish their schooling. The respondents predicted age of schooling 
determines under which president the respondent was educated under. In this paper we have followed 
Kramon and Posner (2016) and Li (2018) in assuming that children start primary school at age 6 and 
complete it at age 13, but it is important to recognize that this is not an unproblematic assumption.  
The Kenyan census data shows that most students do not in fact start and complete at these prescribed 
ages. Appendix Table 1 gives the age distribution of (2009) census respondents who list their highest 
level of education to be Standard 7, but report still being in school. We can assume that most of these 
respondents are currently in Standard 8 (the last year of primary school). Only 17% of these students 
in their last year of primary school are aged 13 years or less and a full 21% are 18 years or above. 
This lack of age-school attendance precision matters for two reasons. First, it means that the dummy 
identifying students educated under a co-ethnic president is not precise, which means that the data is 
unlikely to pick up any sharp discontinuity around the time of a presidential transition. Second, it risks 
biasing the observed ethnic composition of the younger cohorts if the age at which a student 
completes primary schooling is correlated with ethnicity. 
The census data suggests that such biases are indeed large. The ages at which Kenyan students 
complete primary school varies considerably by region. Students born in the richest part of the 
country, such as Nairobi and the Central Province, complete their primary schooling at a younger age, 
on average, than those from more peripheral regions of the country. The average age of students in 
their final year of primary school in 200916 is 14 years among respondents born in Nairobi, 15.1 
among those born in the Central Province, and 16.3 years in the remainder of the country. The model 
will therefore pick up a higher relative educational performance for respondents from richer 
communities than would be the case if those same respondents were interviewed five years later in 
time. Given that the Kikuyu reside in some of Kenya’s wealthiest regions, this will bias their 
performance upward. In Kramon and Posner’s (2016) model this upward bias in Kikuyu educational 
attainment coincides, roughly, with the Kibaki presidency, and may therefore be mistaken for ethnic 
favouritism. For this reason, we include alternative specifications that use a higher cut-off age (>=20), 
by which age ~95% of students will have completed their primary schooling. Unfortunately, this 
means that the datasets capture little of the educational dynamics after the election of President 
Kibaki. 
Appendix Table 1. Distribution of Kenyan students who have completed P.7 and still report being in 
school, by age 
Age # Percentage Cumulative 
<=13 13,296 17% 17% 
14 14,939 19% 35% 
15 14,166 18% 53% 
16 11,855 15% 68% 
17 8,777 11% 79% 
18 6,266 8% 87% 
19 3,543 4% 91% 
20 2,346 3% 94% 
21 1,028 1% 95% 
>=22 3652 5% 100% 
 
16 I.e., those who have completed standard 7 but report still being in school. 
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Appendix 4. Confusing controls? 
A further debatable choice on the part of Kramon and Posner (2016) and Li (2018) is the inclusion of 
controls for the individual respondent’s gender, religion and birth in an urban versus rural area, in 
their models of ethnic favouritism. By introducing dummies (without interactions), the authors 
assume that the impact of gender, religion or urban-rural birth location on attainment remains static 
over time and unrelated to level of a group’s educational attainment. This is clearly not the case, given 
the strong gender convergence in primary attendance and high rates of urbanisation. Furthermore, 
given that the gender composition of each ethnic group is unlikely to be changing over time, it is 
unclear why this variable is relevant in the first place. Instead, it could confound the group trends by 
predicting a lower/higher attainment level for females at the beginning/end of the period, owing to the 
application of a dummy that calculates the average gender gap across the period, despite its sharp 
decline in the gender disparity in primary schooling over time. A more appropriate way of dealing 
with the gender imbalance in the DHS sample would be to use split samples. 
Religion, similarly, should only influence our variable of interest if the religious compositions of 
ethnic groups are changing. If this is indeed the case, it seems very possible that the relationship 
between religion and education will be changing with it, as religions tend to evolve with the 
composition of their adherents.  
Lastly, if the urban-rural composition of ethnic groups are changing at different rates while the 
attainment gap between urban and rural areas are decreasing, it may skew the estimated attainment 
level for groups that urbanise faster towards the end or beginning of the period. For this reason we 
present data and re-run models that both include and exclude these controls. 
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Appendix Table 5. Regression results: ethnic match effect on years of secondary 
schooling, sample restricted to primary school completers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
VARIABLES 
Secondary 
Years 
(DHS) 
Secondary 
Years 
(DHS) 
Secondary 
Years 
(DHS) 
Secondary 
Years 
(Census)   
            
Ethnic match 0.1311* 0.1323* 0.0861    
 (0.0625) (0.0652) (0.0768)    
District ethnic match    -0.026   
    (0.0399)   
Controls       
Religion YES NO NO NO   
Place of birth (urban/rural) YES NO NO NO   
Gender YES NO NO YES   
Weights NO NO NO YES   
Observations 39,258 39,258 34,582 1,388,516   
R-squared 0.0241 0.0159 0.0124 0.0166   
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Notes: 
Model 1: Based on KP model in Table 3, column 1, incl. DHS 2014 (birth cohorts 1950-93, aged 21 and above) 
Model 2: Like Model 1, but excluding controls. 
Model 3: Like Model 2, but limiting birth cohorts to 1950-1988. 
Model 4: Based on KP model in Table 3, column 7 (birth cohorts 1950-88, aged 21 and above) 
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Appendix Table 6: Average KCPE Score by Ethnic Region 
‘Ethnic region’ 
Average 
KCPE score 
Ave years of 
primary schooling 
Nairobi          368 7.5 
Turkana          367 1.1 
Embu          366 6.9 
Kikuyu          363 7.3 
Kalenjin          350 6.4 
Luhya          345 6.6 
Luo          345 6.9 
Kamba          337 6.9 
Kisii          333 7 
Somali          328 1 
Mombasa          327 6.9 
Meru          324 6.3 
Mijikenda          304 4.8 
   
National average          345 6.3 
Coefficient of Variation (CoV) 0.058  
CoV between schools within districts (ave) 0.130  
St. dev. across all schools 49  
Source: Data assembled from Kenafric Industrial Services, 1991, Kenya’s Primary and Secondary Schools 
Network: A Statistical Presentation, sponsored by Christian Churches. 
Notes: ‘Ethnic region’ is defined here as those districts where the given ethnic group constitutes at least 50% of 
population (based on the 2009 census). Districts with less than 50% of their population from any one ethnic 
group are excluded.
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Appendix Figure 7. Convergence in years of primary education: ethnic group average years of schooling as % of national average 
 
Source: pooled data from Kenyan 1969-2009 censuses, Minnesota Population Center, 2018. 
 
 
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
1
1
9
4
2
1
9
4
3
1
9
4
4
1
9
4
5
1
9
4
6
1
9
4
7
1
9
4
8
1
9
4
9
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
1
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
3
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
7
1
9
5
8
1
9
5
9
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
A
v
e 
yr
s 
o
f 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
: 
d
is
ta
n
ce
 t
o
 n
at
l.
 m
ea
n
Year of birth
Kikuyu Luhya Kalenjin Kamba Luo Kisii
Meru Mijikenda Somali Turkana Nairobi/Mombasa Other
Predominantly educated after independence 
